

never have taken the initiative in a war of liberation, and that no French Minister ever pronounced the word *revanche*; but he adds that they one and all declined to forget the two provinces and to be guilty of a cowardly betrayal. The watchword of successive governments was: Neither war nor renunciation!

The heads of the French army were no longer mortally afraid of their formidable neighbours. In a series of widely-read works, *La France victorieuse dans la Guerre de Demain*, *UOffensive contre l'Alkmagne*, and *UAllemagne en PML*, Colonel Boucher, ex-Chief of the Department of Military Operations of the General Staff, exhorted his countrymen to sleep quiet in their beds. France, it was true, was outstripped in population* and was weakened by pacifism and ministerial instability. "So Germany thinks she could defeat us, and treats us like a conquered country. But she is mistaken. This book proves that if we are attacked we are certain of victory. If war broke out to-morrow, we should certainly be supported by our two allies, Russia and England. We are sure of resisting till Russia invades Germany, and then we shall take the offensive and recover Alsace-Lorraine." Another officer worked out the partition of Germany after the coming war. During the two kst years of peace the German Military Attache in Paris sent home a stream of reports on the visible improvement of the French army.

In a remarkable volume, entitled *Faites un Ro?* [sinon faites la Paix, published in 1913, Marcel Sembat, a distinguished Socialist Deputy of the school of Jaures, implored his countrymen to reflect and. to choose. The system of alliances, he argued, was leading Europe towards war. The question of Alsace-Lorraine dominated the life and fortunes of France.

It was necessary to decide between those who reluctantly acquiesced in the status quo and those who aspired to overthrow it at the first favourable opportunity. If the latter aim were adopted as the official policy, it was essential to restore the Monarchy and to concentrate every ounce of material and spiritual energy on preparing for the inevitable conflict.. If, on the other hand, as the author desired, France was prepared to accept the verdict of Sedan, the quarrel should be brought to an end, all the more since, in his opinion, the population of the Rhine provinces dreaded nothing so much as war and wished for autonomy within the German Empire.

Frenchmen rejected both the proffered alternatives of